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Abstract 
Due to the complex and highly dynamic contexts in which systems operate nowadays, it has become crucial that, early in the 
architecting phase, System Architects take into account options to be utilized throughout the system’s lifecycle to improve 
performance and lifecycle properties, such as flexibility. This paper introduces a preliminary approach that allows for the 
identification of relevant options, which are capable of mitigating perturbations negatively impacting a system of interest. The 
approach consists of the generation, evaluation and selection of relevant generalized options (enabling both changeability and 
robustness), and is demonstrated by application to a Maritime Security SoS case study. The inputs to the process are a list of 
desired design principles to implement in the system, and a list of perturbations that may affect the delivery of value to 
stakeholders (options are meant to mitigate perturbations). Four different metrics for option evaluation are proposed, together 
with techniques that can help during the process of selection of options.  
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Having options to employ at future points in time is a strategy widely used in different fields, from finance to 
sport teams, to increase the probability of success of an endeavor. This paper introduces an approach for including 
generalized options in engineering systems. The activity of identifying convenient options can be cognitively and 
computationally intensive when performed for such systems and, therefore, may require a significant amount of 
time. The approach proposed gives guidance for the generation, evaluation and selection of options in a relatively 
timely fashion. 
The world in which systems engineers practice has undergone a significant metamorphosis over the past twenty 
years. The advent of high-speed computation and communication, paralleled by increased complexity and 
interconnectedness, has contributed to the rise of rapidly changing operational environments for systems. 
Additionally, this very dynamic pace can lead to stakeholders varying their needs and preferences through the 
lifecycle of the system. It has therefore become an increasing challenge for systems engineers to anticipate and 
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design for the success of a system. If focused solely on designing for the present state of the world, engineers may 
incur into designing systems that, at some point in the future, operate in contexts for which they were not designed 
[1], and deliver capabilities that are no longer of interest to stakeholders.  
Given the abovementioned problems faced by systems engineers, it is important that they start thinking about 
what options to include in the system architecture early in the design phase, so that they can reduce the risk of 
having systems that do not deliver value to stakeholders. The socio-technical environments in which such systems 
are architected (and will eventually operate) can change rapidly, and, therefore, it is ideal that the identification and 
evaluation of options occur in a timely manner.  
In the context of this paper, a generalized option can be of two flavors: resistance option or change option, and 
these are treated as equally important. In general, an option is the ability to execute a design feature that will change 
or prevent change to the system in order to respond to perturbations. Change and resistance options are in turn a 
combination of path enablers (PE) and change mechanisms (CM), and path inhibitors (PI) and resistance 
mechanisms (RM), respectively [2]. A path variable (be it PE or PI) is the entity that allows for the actuation of 
mechanisms (CM or RM), which are the action taken to respond to the effects of perturbations (e.g., armor is the PI 
that enables the hit absorption RM). The main difference between a resistance option and a change option is that the 
latter, when employed, implies a change in the design of the system while operating. The number of mechanisms 
that a path variable can enable is termed its optionability [3], an important metric that will be further discussed in 
section 2. 
Uncertainty is ubiquitous, especially in highly dynamic environments. When considering complex SoS, it can 
take a variety of different shapes and impacts [4]. In general, uncertainty can stem from endogenous and exogenous 
sources, where the latter are usually related to context and expectation changes [5]. Early analysis of system’s 
boundaries and possible dynamic behaviors is helpful toward the determination of possible sources of uncertainty. 
In the context of this paper and the approach proposed for the case study, uncertainty is parameterized into 
perturbations, which are unintended state changes in a system’s design, context, or stakeholder needs that could 
jeopardize value delivery [2]. Moreover, perturbations are subdivided into “shifts in context and/or needs”, and 
disturbances, which are “finite-(short) duration changes of a system’s design, context, or needs that could affect 
value delivery” [2]. In order to design value robust and well-performing systems, capable of mitigating the impact of 
perturbations, systems architects often draw inspiration from design principles. Design principles can be thought of 
as “guiding thoughts [for design] based on empirical deduction of observed behaviour or practices that prove to be 
true under most conditions over time” [6]. They serve to help intentionally create desirable properties in a system. 
2. Preliminary approach for options identification 
The preliminary approach described henceforth is a first order attempt toward the development of a generalized 
prescriptive method for the identification of relevant options in systems. The approach has three steps: generation, 
evaluation and selection of options. These will be described and demonstrated (via a case study) in the following 
paragraphs. 
2.1. Case study background information 
The case study used to demonstrate the preliminary approach proposed is a Maritime Security (MarSec) System-
of-Systems (SoS), whose main operational goal is to provide maritime security for a particular littoral area of 
interest. The system is required to detect, identify and board boats that constantly enter and exit the area of interest. 
Moreover, upon request, it must be capable of providing for search and rescue of sinking boats or entities in danger 
within the area of interest. The architecture of the SoS has already been defined and includes, among other things, 
UAVs (two different types), planes, helicopters, patrol boats, and radar towers. It is also possible to change 
operational variables such as the segmentation of the area (in terms of what is covered by different UAVs), task 
assignment (what functions are performed by the different constituent systems), and the number of operators per 
UAV. Given the defined MarSec SoS architecture, it is now desired to find options that can be added to this current 
architecture.  
The MarSec SoS falls within the general definition of system-of-systems (“collaborative system”), as proposed 
by Maier [7]. The SoS has constituent systems that can “fulfill valid purposes in their own right” (e.g., helicopters 
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can continue to operate and fulfill purposes outside of the MarSec SoS), and are “managed (at least in part) for their 
own purposes, rather than the purposes of the whole” (e.g., patrol boats are managed by the local port authority). 
Since MarSec is an SoS, it is exposed to some additional uncertainties that an otherwise monolithic system might 
not face. For example, one of the perturbations considered for MarSec is the temporary inability of port authority-
managed assets to participate to the cause of the overall SoS. The fact that this paper demonstrates the proposed 
approach with an application to a system-of-systems does not preclude the possibility of performing the approach on 
“traditional” (i.e. non-SoS) systems. 
2.2. Generation of options 
The inputs into the first task of the proposed approach are relevant design principles and perturbations identified 
for the system of interest. It is assumed here that the identification of these two inputs has taken place during early 
analysis of system’s purpose and boundaries. The goal of this activity is to generate as many options as possible. 
The process of generating options starts by mapping design principles to perturbations, i.e. brainstorming 
instantiations of design principles that can (partially) mitigate the damage caused by a given perturbation. An aid for 
the completion of this task is the matrix shown in Fig. 1, where design principles are listed as rows and perturbations 
(shifts and disturbances) as columns. The empty cells in the matrix contain instantiations of design principles in the 
form of both path variables (PE or PI) and mechanisms (CM or RM). They are filled in during this task. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An application of this task to the MarSec SoS is shown in Fig. 2. In the case of MarSec, design principles and 
perturbations have been previously identified. The design principles (DP) have been derived from ilities of interest: 
as shown in Fig. 2, each set of design principles enables a specific ility. The perturbations have been derived from 
system boundary and dynamic operational environment analyses [8]. In this case, for illustrative and space-related 
reasons, only disturbances are shown as a subset of the perturbations. Although only one instantiation at most has 
been listed per cell for illustrative purposes, more than one idea can be brainstormed for a certain DP-perturbation 
combination. An example flow for this activity would be that, when thinking about ways to resist to a serious attack 
(perturbation), armor comes to mind as an instantiation of the design principle of hardness. 
After the DP to perturbation matrix has been filled out, the next step is to discern among the four entries to the 
matrix (PE, PI, CM and RM) and sort them into four lists, one per entry type. Then, it is possible to match 
compatible PEs and CMs (and PIs and RM) appropriately in order to generate a comprehensive list of change (and 
resistance) options. In order to perform the matching of PEs to CMs and PIs to RMs for the generation of options, a 
matrix listing PEs (PIs) as columns and CMs (RMs) as rows (or vice verse) can be produced. If a path enabler (or 
path inhibitor) is an enabler of a given change mechanism (resistance mechanism), a change (resistance) option is 
created! The content of the cell mapping the row becomes the option ID. 
The application of this process to MarSec is showed in Fig. 3, where the top matrix shows change options and the 
bottom one resistance options. Here, a distinction between path enablers and latent path enablers is made: the latter 
is a feature that is already part of the architecture, and therefore would require little to no cost at all. 
Fig. 1: Design principles to perturbations mapping matrix. 
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Fig. 2: Example design principles to perturbations mapping applied to MarSec (for disturbances only). 
Fig. 3: Generation of change options (top) and resistance options (bottom). 
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Finally, all options generated can be listed as shown in Fig. 4. The lists contain the option ID number and the 
mechanisms and path variables that compose it. 
 
 
2.3. Evaluation of options 
After a comprehensive list of options to consider for inclusion in the system architecture has been generated, the 
next step in the proposed approach is to perform an evaluation. All generated options are evaluated in terms of the 
following four proposed metrics: 
1. Optionability (O): the number of options that are linked to a particular path enabler/inhibitor. Its range is [0 M], 
where M is the total number of options previously generated. The optionability count for options generated for 
the MarSec SoS is shown as the last row of the matrices in Fig. 3. This score solely depends on the path enabler 
(inhibitor) that composes the given option to be evaluated. 
2. Number of Uses (NU): the number of times a particular option can be employed (usually related to its path 
enabler/inhibitor). The range for this metric is composed of three possible assessments, [1 N ∞], where 1 is for 
options that can be only used once, N is for options that can be used a finite number of times, and ∞ is for 
options that can be used an unlimited number of times. For example, C4 (adding vehicle via spares) can only be 
used a finite number of times (N), until there are no more spare vehicles available. On the other hand, R5 
(resistance to an attack using enhanced UAV armor) is an option that, once executed, can be used for the entire 
existence of the SoS, therefore scoring ∞. This metric can be useful when performing dynamic analysis of the 
system, establishing what options will be left as time goes by. 
  Fig. 5 shows the assessment of this metric in the case of options generated for the MarSec SoS. The completion 
of this task is performed more effectively if carried out with the aid of domain experts. 
3. Cost (C): Approximate cost of including (acquiring and executing) the option in the system architecture. This is 
a qualitative assessment carried out with the help of domain experts. The range used in the context of the 
MarSec application is the following: [no low medium high]. Of course, depending on the expertise of people 
Fig. 4: Final list of all options generated for MarSec SoS. 
Change Options 
Mechanism Path Enabler 
1 Adding vehicle Extra interception UAV 
2 Adding vehicle Contract with aircraft supplier 
3 Adding vehicle Workforce buffer 
4 Adding vehicle Spares 
5 Change task assignment Extra interception UAV 
6 Change task assignment Extra cameras 
7 Change task assignment Sea planes 
8 Change task assignment Dispersed Com network 
9 Change task assignment Multi-role asset 
10 Change geographic segmentation Sea planes 
11 Change geographic segmentation Long Range UAV 
12 Change geographic segmentation Dispersed Com network 
13 Change geographic segmentation Satellite Relay 
14 Change number of operators per UAV Pre-validation process 
15 Change number of operators per UAV Workforce buffer 
16 Change number of operators per UAV Spares 
17 Go back to pre-validated set Pre-validation process 
18 Go back to pre-validated set Multi-role asset 
19 Change authority distribution Central authority 
20 Change authority distribution Satellite relay 
21 Add extra features to assets Contract with aircraft supplier 
22 Add extra features to assets Extra cameras 
Resistance Options 
Mechanism Path Inhibitor 
1 Overstaffing Workforce buffer 
2 Change trajectory of flight Better UAV control system 
3 Change trajectory of flight Long range signal transmitter 
4 Change trajectory of flight High altitude UAV 
5 Asset resistance to attacks Armor on UAV 
6 Disperse around AOI Better UAV control system 
7 Disperse around AOI Long range signal transmitter 
8 Disperse around AOI UAV swarm 
9 Multiple assets perform same function Spares 
10 Multiple assets perform same function Multi-role asset 
11 Multiple assets perform same function UAV swarm 
12 Rapidly recover against asset loss Spares 
13 Rapidly recover against asset loss Pre-validation process 
14 Rapidly recover against asset loss Multi-role asset 
15 Distract hostile attacks Decoy 
16 Training personnel for multiple tasks Workforce buffer 
17 Training personnel for multiple tasks Pre-validation process 
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performing this task, and the level of detail they are willing to go into, the precision of the evaluation can vary 
widely. Similarly to NU, it is advisable that this task is performed with the aid of domain experts. 
 The assessment of cost for options identified for MarSec is shown in Fig. 5, next to the assessment of NU. It is 
important to note that options that can be employed with the use of latent path variables are approximated to 
have no cost. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Perturbation coverage (PC): a metric that takes into account impact and probability of perturbations covered by 
a given option. This metric is proposed to be a proxy for risk attenuation. Once again, domain experts can be 
very helpful in assessing this metric, and the fineness of the assessment very much depends on the level of 
knowledge and expertise of the people in charge of this task. Their contribution is threefold: assessment of 
likelihood of occurrence of perturbation, assessment of perturbation impact on system value delivery (upon 
occurrence), and assessment of whether or not a given perturbation is (partially) covered by the option. A 
proposed way of using this information produced is to compile probability (P) and impact (I) assessments 
directly into the following perturbation coverage metric:  
 
PC = Pi
γ I i
i=1
n
∑
    
                                                                        (1) 
 
Where n is the total number of perturbations covered by a given option, Pi is the probability of occurrence of 
perturbation i, Ii is the impact of perturbation i on the system, and γ is the risk aversion factor for the assessor’s 
perceived probability. The use of probability and impact is common for Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
[9] across various disciplines, from finance to engineering.  
In the application to MarSec, the range used for assessment of both probability and impact is [low medium 
high]. The assessment of perturbations’ probability and impact is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Evaluation of options (first column) in terms of number of uses (second column) 
and cost (third column) applied to Marsec SoS. 
Fig. 6: Assessment of perturbations' probability and impact for MarSec case study. 
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In order to complete the evaluation of perturbation coverage, an assessment of whether or not a perturbation is 
covered by a given option must be carried out. A helpful tool to perform this task is a matrix mapping options to 
perturbations. Fig. 7 shows such a matrix for the case of MarSec. The matrix includes options listed as rows and 
perturbations as columns, and it displays information about whether options cover perturbations (“1” vs. empty 
cell), how well an option can mitigate against the full set of perturbations (sum across columns), and how well a 
perturbation is mitigated against (sum across rows). The table shows that C2 (adding vehicle via a contract with 
aircraft supplier) is the most “perturbation-mitigating” change option, while tsunami is the most commonly 
mitigated perturbation by the set of options listed (this is probably because its impact on the system is 
widespread and many things can be done to mitigate against it). The score of the sum across columns can be an 
alternative (more simple) metric to the one given in equation (1) for perturbation coverage.   
 It is important to note that the simple model used in this approach implies that an option either fully covers a 
perturbation or it does not cover it at all. More complex approaches can be used and are mentioned in the 
discussion section (Section 3).  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Perturbation coverage matrix for MarSec SoS case study. 
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2.4. Selection of Options 
So far, all generated options have been evaluated in terms of the metrics proposed. The next and last activity 
performed is to downselect promising options. In this activity, systems engineers (with the aid of stakeholders) 
decide what options to include in the system architecture. The list of selected options can be final or preliminary, 
depending on their preferences. In the first case, the options selected are included in the system architecture directly. 
In the second case, the selected options are further analyzed by means of Modeling and Simulation (M&S), prior to 
making final decisions.  
Different techniques to facilitate decision-making can be used at this point. The first one, used in the MarSec case 
study, is a visualization enhancement tool that allows for consideration of multiple metrics simultaneously (see Fig. 
8a). It consists of a risk chart [10] on which perturbations (shifts in purple and disturbances in green) are located 
depending on their probability and impact. Associated with the perturbation is a list of options (green for change 
options and red for resistance options) that defines the “coverability” of the perturbation, i.e., how well a 
perturbation is covered given the comprehensive list of options initially generated. These options are in turn 
characterized by different shapes that correspond to different number of uses (NU). The next step would be to 
include the option ID number within the shapes, so to identify options that appear more frequently or mitigate very 
risky perturbations (top-right corner). Another interesting analysis that can be performed at this point is to separately 
plot different subsets (portfolios) of options, and investigate the ones that have a more homogeneous coverage of the 
perturbation set.  
 
 
The second proposed tool is a risk-benefit analysis technique, which consists of trading perturbation coverage 
(PC – proxy for risk mitigation) versus cost (whose minimization is considered beneficial) on a two-dimensional 
space, in order to identify distinct options that are Pareto efficient in terms of PC maximization and cost 
minimization. Preliminary results from the MarSec case study, shown in Fig. 8b, illustrate how resistance option 
R10 and change option C2 are very efficient in terms of these two objectives, and should be seriously considered for 
inclusion in the system. Here, equation (1) has been used to calculate PC. 
The next step (which will be taken in the near future) is to explore risks and benefits associated with investing in 
subsets (i.e., portfolios) of options. In a similar manner to financial portfolio theory [11], this approach will allow 
for the identification of sets of options that, through diversification, can either (1) maximize risk mitigation for a 
certain budget constraint, or (2) minimize cost for a preferred level of risk mitigation. Additional analysis with 
regard to the exploration of the dynamics of the PC versus cost tradespace can also be made by taking into account 
the number of executions (NU metric) associated with the options present in a given set.  
Fig. 8: (a) Visualization of perturbation coverage by the comprehensive set of options identified; (b) Visualization of perturbation coverage 
versus cost tradespace. 
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3. Discussion 
The preliminary approach for the identification of relevant perturbation-mitigating options presented in this paper 
is a first order attempt to tackle a problem that is very broad, and that includes many complex issues. Many of these 
issues stem from the evaluation part of the approach. Evaluation of cost and risk are not straightforward activities to 
perform. The latter, for example, can be a very abstract concept, and have many layers of complexity embedded in it 
(e.g., evaluation of probability and impact of a perturbation). Quantification of risk is often based on fragile 
assumptions about the future and human behaviors: this is true even for financial analyses, where much is based on 
risk estimations [11]. There are several relevant points that the development of this approach (as demonstrated in the 
MarSec SoS case) has brought up. Some of these are: 
∞ The assessment of certain metrics, such as perturbations’ probability and impact, as well as cost, strongly 
depends on the level of knowledge and expertise of the people involved in the evaluation task. The fineness of 
the grid of the risk chart (see Fig. 8a), for instance, depends on the degree of differentiation one can make among 
different levels of probability and impact. In general, a grid that is at least 5 by 5 is suggested for systems 
engineering practices, if one can reasonably estimate the assignment of alternatives to these levels [10]. 
∞ The perturbation coverage quantification problem is not a simple one. First, options do not usually mitigate the 
full impact of a perturbation. They often mitigate a portion of the total damage a perturbation causes. 
Considerations related to the lifetime of a perturbation [13] and option utilization timing ought to be made in 
order to incorporate partial damage coverage in the analysis. For instance, in equation (1), a factor that takes into 
account the percentage of the perturbation that is covered can be included. Second, the use of multiple options 
together can bring about emergent perturbation coverage.  
∞ The union of path variables and mechanisms forms options. In the process of evaluating the option, especially for 
some of the metrics, a problem arises: it is not clear if one should consider each option as its own entity (PE and 
CM). Some path enablers can enable more than one mechanism, and, while there are PEs that once are linked to 
mechanisms can not be separated anymore, there are others that can be reused for the enabling of different 
mechanisms at different times. It is not easy to add these considerations into the evaluation of options, and future 
research will be done in this direction.  
∞ As stated in the introduction of this paper, the time component is a very important one to consider for systems. 
Throughout the approach presented, this issue was tackled only by the number of uses (NU) metric. In order for 
this metric to become most effective though, it is important that one be able to consider the approximate number 
of occurrences of a perturbation through time as well. This way, a dynamic analysis of perturbation coverage 
could be performed. 
∞ The assessment of cost was performed on discrete levels in order to generate initial cost differentiation among the 
various options. However, the detailed quantification of the cost of an option would be quite complex and include 
many cost types: initial cost (i.e., acquisition cost), carrying cost (associated with maintaining the ability to 
execute the option at a future point in time), and execution cost [2]. Moreover, when considering the inclusion of 
a set of options, it is important to keep in mind that higher degrees of diversification of the options in the set (i.e., 
heterogeneity) can result in higher costs. Lastly, if the set of options is known to vary over time, switching costs 
must be considered as well [14]. 
∞ As proposed in the paper, the approach can be used to help screen important options. The metrics and ranges 
proposed, although based on assessments made by (collaborating) systems engineers and domain experts, lead to 
useful results in terms of differentiating between options. This differentiation is then the foundation of the option 
selection activity. As for all methods that use estimated input data, the validity of the results is directly 
proportional to the accuracy of the inputs. While it could be possible to reach appropriate estimates for the 
assessment of cost (requiring more time), it is harder to do so for probabilistic risk assessments. In fact, since 
many of the considered perturbations could be low-frequency or entirely novel, empirical data for validation 
could be lacking. Even so, the approach is scalable to the availability and confidence analysts have in the data 
(e.g. use fewer levels with more uncertain data). Sensitivity analysis on uncertain data can give valuable 
information about the robustness of insights. Of course, the more analytical parts of the approach (such as PC 
calculation and portfolio analysis) become more relevant as the quality and resolution of the data improves. 
Another important benefit of the approach is that it stimulates discussion among experts, and forces engineers to 
think about aspects of the problem that could have been disregarded otherwise.  
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Overall, the illustrated approach allows for relatively quick identification of options that can be relevant for a 
given system architecture. Currently, complex techniques such as Valuation Approach for Strategic Changeability 
(VASC) [15] are effective in terms of quantitatively evaluating options, but can require significant time, as the 
simulations (of change and resistance mechanisms) and analyses associated with it can be very complex and 
extensive. Given systems have high interconnectedness, fast technology advancement, and high information 
exchange rate, decision time is becoming an increasingly crucial factor to consider. Delivering “the findings on 
engineering issues and solution trade-offs to decision makers in timely fashion” has become very important [16]. 
The approach illustrated, due to its rapid evaluation processes, would allow for making trades on what options to 
include when there is insufficient time to perform a more extensive activity. Moreover, other contributions of this 
approach are in terms of systems risk-benefit analysis techniques, an area that is also identified as in need of 
advancement by Neches and Madni [16]. 
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